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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i)

Nature of the Case:

This is a quiet title case involving the interpretation of a temporary easement. Appellants
Andre\v and Kimberly Kirk ('"Kirks") seek to quiet title to the southeast comer of their property
lot located in a plated subdivision in Blaine County, Idaho. The Respondent Ann Wescott ("Ms.
Wescott") owns the adjoining lot and contends that the southeast comer of the Kirks' lot is
encumbered by a '·temporary Easement of Access'' granted to her by the prior owner/developer
of the lots. The purported ''temporary Easement of Access" (hereinafter ·'Temporary Easement'')
was attached as an exhibit to the Warranty Deed that transferred Lot 8 to Ms. Wescott.
The Kirks contend that the purported Temporary Easement never came "In Effect" for
lack of satisfaction of an express condition precedent stating that ·'[t]his Easement of Access
shall become · In Effect' only upon receipt by the owner (of Lot 8) of written denial by the USFS
for the owner (of Lot 8) to access Lot 8 across USFS lands on the East side of the property line
(of Lot 8) and beginning at Bench Road." The document further places a one year time limit on
the Temporary Easement in any event. \Vhich has long since expired. Notwithstanding, the
District Court ruled on paiiial summary judgment that as a matter of law the Temporary
Easement must remain permanently on the SE corner of Kirks' Lot 7. The District Court denied
two successive Motions to Amend Complaint. After a short trial limited in scope to the issue of
equities, the District Court dismissed the Kirks' Complaint.
(ii)

Course of Proceedings:

The Kirks filed a Complaint to quiet title to the SE corner of their Lot 7 against the
Temporary Easement pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-401 et seq. against Ms. Wescott on August 3,

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - I

2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 8.

The disputed alleged

reads as

105 Jones
This Warranty Deed shall include a temporary 25 foot wide Easement of
Access. (See plat map - Exhibit
over the Southeast comer of Lot 7 of Block 1
of the Glassford Heights Sub for access to
8 of the Glassford Heights Sub.
When/if Blaine county and the United States Forest Service provide a permanent
access across USFS Lands to Lot 8, the owner of Lot shall Quitclaim the
Easement of Access back to Lot 7 within 30 days of \vritten receipt thereof.
This Easement of Access shall become "In Effect" only upon receipt by
the owner (of Lot 8) of written denial by the USFS for the owner (of Lot 8) to
access Lot 8 across USFS lands on the East side of the property line (of Lot 8)
and beginning at Bench Road. This Easement of Access shall remain "In Effect"
only until Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane. The
O\Vner' s of Lot 8 shall Quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7 within one
year or upon completion of the driveway, \Vhichever occurs first.
R. Vol. L p. 13. The Complaint alleged that Ms. Wescott obtained a 30-year (with 10-year
renewal) access easement in May 2007 from the United States Forest Service ("USFS") on the
east side of her Lot 8 such that the conditions for requiring a Temporary Easement no longer
existed.

R. Vol. L pp. 16-21.

Ms. Wescott answered and filed her Motion for Summary

Judgment on October 28, 2013, arguing that the Kirks' Complaint must be dismissed on the basis
that a USFS Easement does not provide permanent access to Lot 8, and that one portion of the
Temporary Easement could not be satisfied according to the express terms. R. Vol. l, p. 26. The
Kirks filed their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on March 5, 2014. R. Vol. 1, p. 45. The
Kirks' Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment asserted that the
Temporary Easement never came into effect or, if it did, it expired under its expressed terms, or
in the alternative, that Ms. Wescott abandoned her interest in the Temporary Easement. R. Vol.

1, p. 47.
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At the summary judgment oral

on

3

the District Court issued an

bench

it
face
the document
Well,
certainly is a problem,
exactly what was intended. I don't think I can look at any particular line and say
this is clear and unambiguous and therefore this yields a clear result. I think you
have to read the document as a whole and you can't pick out one part and have
that be determinative, and that seems to be the problem here.

But I have to rule as a matter of law that the forest service has not given
permanent access, and I think that that is clear from the pleadings and from the
cross motions for summary judgment.
And I know that I am adding words that are not there in order to come up with
these possible explanations, but to me that's the only thing that language could
mean.
Another way that I looked at this is to say, well, this is a quiet title action. It's. I
think, essentially equitable. I don't think it's a jury trial issue.

And lord knows what the last line means. but because they solved it, it would
seem to be very inequitable to the party who obtained the easement to then turn
around and have a court say, well, you really got hoaxed here.
It is a cloud, I certainly agree, on the servient lot, but I hope it's not a cloud that
ever causes a problem.
Tr., Court's Rulings and Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, March 31, 2014, pp. 2. 3, 8.
11, I 2. 13. The District Court went on in its oral ruling to grant partial summary judgment to
Ms. Wescott finding: (i) that the U.S. Forest Service has not provided a permanent access to Ms.
Wescott; (ii) that Blaine County is no longer in a position to provide any access and. therefore,
cannot fulfill one of the conditions of the Temporary Easement; and (iii) that there has been no
abandonment of the Temporary Easement.

Tr., Court's Rulings and Remarks on Summary

Judgment Motions, March 31. 2014, p. 20, L. 15-20.
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On

18, 2014, the Kirks

to Amend Complaint based upon the

that being an
description referenced ·'

LOTS 8 & 9.

newly discovered easement, while issued to the owners (Woodcocks) of Lot 9, did not have a
year term limit and the recorded legal description arguably was intended to benefit Westcott's
adjoining Lot 8 '·to continue for as long as the property served is used for a single family
residence.'' R. Vol. 1, pp. 111-125. The Kirks filed the Plaintiffs· Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Amend Complaint, setting out the newly discovered evidence of the August 2000
USFS easement providing the arguable permanent access to Wescotfs Lot 8. R. Vol. I, p. 126.
Ms. Wescott filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint on
April 28, 2014. R. Vol. I. p. 148. A hearing was held on said motion on May 5, 2014, and the
District Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the complaint once again, ruling from the
bench with statements including:
[S]o whatever evidence we gather of Woodcocks' intent and the government's
intent as expressed to Blaine County or the intent that might be gleaned from the
parties and Mr. Manwaring saying we can present evidence of all these people's
intent, that matters not.

And I can take evidence for weeks on what everybody intended and what they
wanted to do . . . .

That brings up a couple of other points. Even on its face, if I - if I heard
additional evidence, the easement that exists now from the government says it
expires. And we can argue about what that means. and I can come up with my
conclusions about what that means . . . .

My point is. is that it's a question when it expires. It's a question whether it's
pennanent so long as it's used for a personal residence. To me, that's not
permanent. You can argue that it is.
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So if I entertain the motion to amend
the relief

I can't solve the problem by ente1iaining evidence as to the questions that Mr.
Manwaring has been able to raise. When he says, you know, there are issues of
fact and there are questions of intent, I'll certainly agree with that, but even
resolving those and even ifI resolved
his favor. I would simply be leaving
Ms. Wescott with a worse problem than the Kirks have.

But if we're going to have a trial and argue about it, it just better be real clear that
it's a permanent easement or the trial is going to take five minutes, because I don't
need to hear intent, I don't need to hear -- I don't want to hear any evidence of
who intended what or, really. what you were trying to get at with the amended
complaint.

But like I say, I want to be clear here. I don't want to have a trial and hear what
anybody intended.

Transcript of Court's Rulings and Remarks. May 5, 201

pp. 5, 6. 7, 8, 9, 13, 18. The Court

entered an Order dated May 28, 2014 denying the Motion to Amend. R. Vol. I, p. 174. A trial
was set for July 23, 2014 limited to the issue of equities, but excluding any evidence of the intent
as to interpretation of the Temporary Easement.
Prior to trial, a Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint was filed by Plaintiffs on July 14,
2014, due to receipt of an extremely late supplemental document production from Ms. Wescott,
including 109 pages of documents that had not previously been produced by Defendant, some of
which had been withheld but suppmied Plaintiffs· assertion in the proposed First Amended
Complaint that the Woodcocks' August 2000 USFS easement was intended to benefit Wescott's
Lot 8. R. Vol. I. pp. 2 I 6-261. At the trial held on

23. 201

the District Court denied the

Kirks' Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint, refused to admit certain documents to show intent
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parties.

on Appeal, July 23,

dismissed Plaintiffs' petition to
to

evidence of

and excluding

Judgment for the Defendant Wescott on

August 25, 2014. R. Vol. I, p. 281.
On September 4. 2014, Ms. Wescott filed her Memorandum of Costs [and attorney fees].
(Suppl. R. pp. 1-29), to which Plaintiffs filed a timely Objection to Memorandum of Costs and
Amended Objection and Motion to Disallow Memorandum of Costs (Supp. R. pp. 30-35). The
District Court heard the attorney fee claim on October 27, 2014 and denied the attorney fees in a
bench ruling followed by an Order Denying Attorney Fees entered on November 3, 2014. R.
Vol. I, p. 289.
The Kirks filed their Notice of Appeal to this Court on October 2, 2014. R. Vol. I, p. 285.
After the attorney fee issue was decided an Order Denying Attorney Fees and an Amended
Judgment were entered on November 3, 2014. R. Vol. 1, pp. 289, 293. Kirks then filed an
Amended Notice of Appeal on November 14. 2014. R. Vol. I, p. 295.
Pursuant to I.A.R. 14(a) and 15(b), Ms. Wescott had 42 days from the Order Denying
Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment (11/3/15) to file any cross-appeal, meaning Ms. Wescott
could file a notice of cross appeal on or before December 15. 2014. However, Ms. Wescott did
not file her Notice of Cross-Appeal until February 23, 2015, a full 98 days after the Order
Denying Attorney Fees was entered. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 70. Rather. on November 13, 2014, Ms.
Wescott filed a Motion to Reconsider Defendant's Memorandum of Costs. Suppl. R. p. 58.
(iii)

Statement of Facts:

In 1997. Leif Odmark (hereinafter ·'Mr. Odmark'') was the owner of undeveloped real
property, including Lot 7 and Lot 8, in the Glassford Heights Subdivision in Blaine County.
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Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 13 8-139.

Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock (hereinafter "Woodcocks")

owned the adjacent Lot 9. R. Vol I, p. 140. Bordering Lots 7. 8, and 9, was undeveloped platted
access to the properties on the west border of the lots designated as "Jones Lane." R. Vol. I, p.
131; and platted map of Lots 7, 8, and 9 of Glassford Heights Subdivision at R. Vol. I, p. 21.
Development of the Jones Lane access would have required construction of a driveway from
State Highway 75 across jurisdictional wetlands. R. Vol I, p. 141. The Jones Lane property was
owned by Blaine County. Id. There was also access on the east side of Lots 8 and 9 over U .S.
USFS lands. R. Vol. I, p. 61 . The USFS road access provided the historical access to both Lots

8 and 9. Id. A diagram of the Jots and roads is as follows :
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R. Vol. I,

21 (modified with owners·
Woodcocks. owners

1997

to

to protect and preserve
141. This would prevent any development of Jones Lane for access to Lots 7, 8, and 9. Id. In
conjunction with this request. the Woodcocks also applied for a Special Use Permit through the
USFS for a permanent access easement over the USFS land bordering the east property line of
Lots 8 and 9. R. Vol I, p. 130. A Special-Use Application and Report, prepared by Woodcock
and Bruce Smith, a Professional Land Surveyor of Galena Engineering. Inc., states as follows:
The proposed use is a permanent easement for all-year residential
purposes, including utilities and access. for Glassford Heights Subdivision, Lot 9,
from the existing Bench Road, a public road maintained by Blaine County ....
The proposed use would provide upland access to Lot 8 as well and as Lot 7 is
using upland access from Bench Road, eliminate the need to build Jones Lane and
provide an opportunity for the preservation of the wetlands.

Id. (emphasis added).
On July I

1998, the then owner/developer of Lots 7 and 8, Leif Odmark, wrote to the

USFS in favor of the proposed Woodcock Easement referring to it as a ·'permanent easement."
R. Vol. Ip. 234. On March 5, 1999, the USFS issued a News Release soliciting comments on the
proposed easement stating that the proposed easement actually was an old right of way "which
parallels Lots 8 and 9 [in Glassford Heights Subdivision]." ·'Access to these two lots was
originally planned to be through Jones Lane." Exhibit 8 lodged with trial exhibits.
While Woodcocks' Special Use Application was pending with the USFS and Blaine
County, Mr. Odmark sold Lot 8 to Mr. and Mrs. McEiveen 1 (now known as Ms. Wescott) on
April 14, 2000. The Warranty Deed granted by Mr. Odmark to the McElveens [Ms. Wescott]
contains the following language:
1 Ann McElveen returned to her maiden name of Wescott after her divorce from Mr. McElveen. Lot 8 was
transferred via Quitclaim Deed to Ms. Wescott as a result of the divorce.
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Block l of GLASSFORD

L
R. VoL I, p. 12. The Wmwnty Deed's Exhibit
~
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following terms:
Exhibit ·• 1"
105 Jones Lane
This WmTanty Deed shall include a temporary 25 foot wide Easement of
Access. (See plat map - Exhibit 2) over the Southeast corner of Lot 7 of Block I
of the Glassford Heights Sub for access to Lot 8 of the Glassford Heights Sub.
When/if Blaine county and the United States Forest Service provide a permanent
access across USFS Lands to Lot 8, the owner of Lot shall Quitclaim the
Easement of Access back to Lot 7 within 30 days of written receipt thereof

This Easement of Access shall become "In Effect" only upon receipt
by the owner (of Lot 8) of written denial by the USFS for the owner (of Lot 8)
to access Lot 8 across U SFS lands on the East side of the property line ( of Lot
8) and beginning at Bench Road. This Easement of Access shall remain "In
Effect" only until Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane.
The owner's of Lot 8 shall Quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7
within one vear or upon completion of the driveway, whichever occurs first.
R. VoL I, p. 13 (Emphasis Added). The condition precedent to the easement, i.e. the denial by
USFS of access to Lot 8, had not been satisfied. R. Vol. L p. 67,

,r 6.

Just four months later, the USFS granted Woodcocks' Special Use Application by issuing
a Forest Road Easement recorded in Blaine County on August 15, 2001 as Instrument No.
442116.

It provided the legal description title as "A 33' WIDE EASEMENT TO ACCESS

LOTS 8 & 9.'' R. Vol. I pp. 121-125. The easement was to ··continue for as long as the prope11y
served is used for a single family residence." R. Vol I, p. 121 (emphasis in original).
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Blaine County Board of

Woodcock

U

Forest Service,

Lots 8 and 9 from Bench Road on the east

Staff Report vacating Jones

6.

easement provides access to

the lots." R. Vol. I, p. 237, , 6 (emphasis

added).
The McElveens (Ms. Wescott) proceeded to develop Lot 8 and built a home and
constructed a paved driveway accessing the USFS road. R. Vol. I, p. 60-70. The Temporary
Easement of access across Lot 7 was never used or needed by the McElveens (Ms. Wescott)
from the time Lot 8 was acquired on April 1 2000 until present. R. VoL L p. 65.
Unfortunately, this documentary evidence surrounding the Woodcocks' application for a
permanent easement: the Application; the Blaine County's letter support for the application; the
developer-Odmark's letter of support for the application; the USFS' News Release; the County's
interpretation of the easement; and the Woodcocks' easement itself, were not discovered until
after the Complaint was filed and summary judgment was pending.

A Motion to Amend

Complaint (R. Vol L pp. 111-125) and a second Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint (R. Vol.
I, pp. 216-261) were filed and asserted. but the District Court denied both motions, refusing to
consider the intent of the parties in interpreting Wescott's Temporary Easement. Transcript of
Court's Rulings and Remarks, May 5. 2014, pp. 5, 6, 7. 8. 9, 13. 18; Transcript on Appeal, July
23, 2014, pp. 4-31.
On May 15, 2007, a subsequent non-exclusive access easement was granted directly to
Ms. Wescott by the USFS, and recorded as Instrument No. 547881, Records of Blaine County,
Idaho, on May 22, 2007 (the "Wescott Easement"). R. Vol. I, p. 16-21. The Wescott Easement
covers the same location and includes the identical '·Exhibit A" establishing the property
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of

easement as attached in

Woodcock Easement. Id. at

A

easement states
8

subsequent

9, GLASSFORD

easement has caused confusion with its expiration date of December 31, 2036, and renewal
period of 10 years

··cor the estimated

project, whichever is less)." R. Vol. I, p. 16. By

its terms, the easement does not override the pre-existing Woodcock Easement that was granted
in August 2000. Id
The USFS access road became known as Blackwood Lane. R. Vol l. p. 58-59. Ms.
Wescott's address is listed as 10 Blackwood Lane, Ketchum, Idaho. Id Ms. Wescott's driveway
is at least 25' away from the boundary line of Lot 7. Id. at 20.

Her driveway extends directly

onto the USFS easement road. R. Vol. I, p. 61-62. Ms. Wescott has never driven over any
portion of Lot 7 for access to her property. R. Vol. L p. 65.

Ms. Wescott has had continuous

use of the USFS road and there has been no interference of Ms. Wescott's use of this road by
neighbors, USFS. Blaine County, or anyone
On or about January 11. 2010, the

R. Vol. I, p. 63.

acquired title to Lot 7. R. Vol. 1, p. 10,, 1

Sometime later in 2010, subsequent to the purchase of Lot 7. the Kirks became aware that Ms.
Wescott claimed to own an easement in
action to quiet title to their property.
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southeast corner of Lot 7. Appellants brought this

ISSUES ON APPEAL
commit
to consider issues
Temporary Easement?

judgment
regarding

2. Did the District Court commit error in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
Complaint based upon newly discovered evidence bearing on the intent of the parties
to the Temporary Easement?
3. Did the District Court commit error in denying Plaintiffs· Renewed Motion to Amend
Complaint based upon Defendant's withholding of documents until two weeks before
trial which documents additionally supported Plaintiffs' asserted intent of the parties
to the Temporary Easement?
4. Should the District Court have found after trial that the Temporary Easement was
void for lacking an adequate legal description?

ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL
1. Is the Supreme Court without jurisdiction to hear the Notice of Cross-Appeal because
it was filed untimely?
2. Did the District Court commit error in finding that the Plaintiffs' Complaint was not
filed or pursued frivolously pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121?

ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review.
A. Summary Judgment.
When this Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment, it uses the same

standard properly employed by the district court originally ruling on the motion.

Carl H

Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999).

Summary

judgment is proper '·if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law:' Id. at 870. ''The record is construed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving
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and

reasonable

are drawn

favor of

party.

If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions. summary judgment is

P.3d 81

36

8 9

B. Ambiguity of Document.

'·The existence of ambiguity determines the standard of review of a lower court's
interpretation of a contract or instrument." A1achado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212,217,280 P.3d 715.
720 (Idaho 2012). ··The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by
the trial court as a question of law."

however. the instrument of conveyance is

Id

ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for the trier of fact.'' Id "Whether
a document is ambiguous is a question of law.'' Id.
C. Motion to Amend Complaint.

"A court's decision to allow the amendment

pleadings is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. When determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion. this Court asks:
·(I) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion: (2) whether it acted

within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently with any applicable legal
standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.'" Hayward at 345
(citing Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230,232,953 P.2d 980. 982 (1998)) (internal citations omitted).

II.

On Summary Judgment, the District Court Should Have Found the
Temporary Easement to be Ambiguous as a Matter of Law and
Thereafter Allowed a Trial on the Facts to Determine the Intent of the
Parties.
The primary goal in construing a deed is ..to seek and give effect to the real intention of

the parties."

Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636. 639, 315 P.3d 824, 827 (Idaho 2013) (citing

1vfachado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 218. 280

715.

1 (2012)). ·'If the language of a deed is

ambiguous, determining the parties' intent is a question of fact and may only be settled by a trier
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fact.'' Id. "[W]hen the language

is unambiguous,

a

evidence.

the deed's

matter

intention of the parties

Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of law. Id. at 638 (citing Ida-Therm. LLC v.
Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6, 8, 293 P.3d 630, 632 (2012)). "Ambiguity may be
found where the language of the deed is subject to conflicting interpretations." Id. at 639.
However, ambiguity does not exist simply because opposing parties differ in their
interpretations. Id. (citing Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151 Idaho 790, 798, 264 P .3d 897, 905 (2011) ).
''To determine whether a deed is ambiguous, [the deed] must be reviewed as a whole."

Id.

(citing Neider v. Shaiv, 138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003)).
Likewise, ··[i]n construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the
easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted." Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho
282,286,246 P.3d 391. 395 (2010) (citing Kou/ouch v. Kramer. 120 Idaho 65, 69, 813 P.2d 876,
880 (1991)).
The Temporary Easement contains numerous ambiguous statements and terms. The trial
court stated in the initial hearing in this matter, ·'Well, this certainly is a problem, and it isn't
clear from the face of the document exactly what was intended. I don't think I can look at any
particular line and say this is clear and unambiguous and therefore this yields a clear result. I
think you have to read the document as a

and you can't pick out one part and have that be

determinative, and that seems to be the problem here.'' Transcript Court's Rulings & Remarks
on Summary Judgment Motions, March 31, 2014. p.

L. 9-16.

That being said, however, the

trial court then focused its interpretation of the Temporary Easement only on the specific
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of

''permanent"

taking a narrow

sentence

as a
the
Easement is a classic example of an ambiguous document, especially when one considers the
subsequently discovered documents including: Woodcocks' Special Use Permit Application:
Blaine County letter to USFS; Odmark's letter to the USFS; the USFS' News Release;

the

August 2000 Woodcocks' Forest Road Easement; and the Staff Rep011 to the Blaine County
Board of County Commissioners.
''Ambiguity can be found where the language of the deed is subject to conflicting
interpretations. The trier of fact must then determine the intent of the parties according to the
language of the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding the transaction."

Marek v.

Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50, 53, 278 P.3d 920. 923 (Idaho 201

Appellants, Kirks, contend that the district com1 erred in not specifically ruling as a
matter of law that the easement terms were ambiguous. If such a ruling had been entered, the
com1 would be required at trial to consider all extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties and
the circumstances in existence at the time the easement was drafted.

III.

The District Court abused its Discretion in Denying Plaintiffs' Motions to
Amend Complaint and Excluding Evidence of the Intent of the
Temporary Easement.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 5(a) specifies '"[A] party may amend a pleading only by

leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires ... " I.R.C.P. l 5(a). ··[I]n the interest of justice, district courts should favor
liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint." Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corporation, 136
Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 (Idaho 2001)
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Carl H Christensen Family Trust v.

Christensen. 133 Idaho 866, 87L 993 P2d 1

reason -

(1999)).

the absence of any apparent

as

to cure deficiencies

to

undue

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave
sought should, as the rules require, be freely given." Id. at 346.
·'Other factors this Court considers when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a
motion to amend include: 1)

the amended pleading provides a valid claim; 2) if the opposing

party would be prejudiced by the delay in adding the claim: and 3) if

opposing party has an

available defense such as the statute of limitations.'' Id
In the instant case, the Kirks moved to amend the complaint shortly after the summary
judgment hearing, due to the discovery

new evidence and potential witnesses that would

support the assertion that the Woodcock Easement granted by the USFS in August 2000 was the
very easement contemplated by the language four months earlier in April 2000 in the Warranty
Deed/Temporary Easement from Mr. Odmark to Ms. Wescott. R. Vol. I, p. 115,

,i,-; 8,

10. The

Motion to Amend Complaint identified the newly discovered documents of: the Woodcock
Forest Road Easement of August 2000; the Special-Use Application and Report: and an August
l I, 1998 letter from Blaine County to USFS. R. Vol. I. pp. 121-125, 130-142. On May 5, 2014,
the District Court wrongly denied the motion to amend the complaint holding that it refused to
consider the new documents as evidence of intent bearing on the Temporary Easement.
Transcript of Court's Rulings and Remarks, May 5, 2014, pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 18; R. Vol. I, p.
174. This was an abuse of discretion and contrary to Rule 15(a) that amendments should be
"freely given.''
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Complaint on July l

Kirks subsequently filed a

20 I

a

14, 1998. letter from Odmark to
Commissioners.

a Staff Report to Blaine County Board of

R. Vol. L pp. 216-245, 261-263.

Both of these documents supp011ed the

allegation in the proposed First Amended Complaint that the ··permanent easement'' referenced
in the Temporary Easement was intended to mean the August 2000 Woodcock Easement.
In June 2013. counsel for Ms. Wescott responded to Plaintiffs' requests for production of
documents for all relevant documents and correspondence pertaining to the case described in
several ways. R. Vol. I, pp. 219-223. When these documents were not forthcoming, a letter was
sent to Mr. Trout in February 2014 seeking production of such documents. R. Vol. L pp. 224226. Again, there were no documents provided as Mr. Trout claimed he had produced all the
documents. R. Vol. I, pp. 227-228. Then, on July 7,

just two weeks before triaL Mr. Trout

supplemented with over 100 pages of documents, including documents with key information as
to the intent and circumstances surrounding the historical information leading up to the drafting
of the Temporary Easement. R. Vol. L pp. 229-245. Kirks· counsel argued in support of the
Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint:
Now, Mr. Trout had these documents m
possession, and he didn't
produce them to me before Ms. Wescott's deposition. He didn't produce them to
me before we had the cross motion for summary judgment. He didn't produce
them to me while we had the motion to amend in May [2014], and he didn't
produce them to me until after my deadline to produce my evidence in preparation
for this hearing today, this trial today [July 23. 2014]. My deadiine was July 2nd
[2014].
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, p. 11-12.
These documents are key.
also infer and indicate that the Woodcock
easement of August 2000 was this supposed permanent easement that Mr.
Odmark references
to
s the one they were

APPELLANTS'

- 17

contemplating when he made up
temporary easement.

language that 1s so ambiguous on the

disclosure,
based
I think
only fair and equitable
motion to amend be renewed, the
renewed motion be granted, and the Court give plaintiff the opportunity to go
forward into December 1ih [2014] to develop that additional claim under the
amended complaint, which is the same that was filed back in April [2014).
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, p. 12-13.
When asked by the District Court to respond to the allegations that the documents had
been \vTOngfolly withheld. Mr. Trout explained as follows:
Well, that's my fault. I['m] not going to deny I didn't withhold them. I
didn't actually understand that I had them. I had a bunch of documents we
looked at what we thought was relevant to the case, and we produced documents
as pm1 of the expert opinion. And the only reason we made a supplement, the
only reasons there was one reason: We just threw the whole batch in the
scanner, scanned them and sent them.
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, p.
Now, if I made a mistake, I' 11 · fess up. If I wrong about making that
supplement I'll 'fess up. If it was late, I'll ·fess up. At the end of the day, Judge,
so what? He has two inadmissible documents that mean nothing to the
interpretation of this case; and yes, they could have been found. We didn't go
looking for them because we didn't
looking for them. They just happened to
be in a big group of paper.
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, p. 23. While the District Court expressed sympathy, he
nevertheless denied the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment reat1irming his previous
summary judgment ruling that there is no "permanent" easement from the USFS for Ms.
Wescott, so it does not matter what the intent of the Temporary Easement was.
Appeal, July 23, 2014. pp. 28-31.

Transcript on

This denial was additional abuse of discretion and the

standard of Rule 15(a) that amendments should be "freely given."

Through this denial, the

District Court effectively condoned the withholding of requested documents which bear on the
intent of the drafter of the Temporary Easement.
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denials

motions

District

foreclosed itself

and
,<,-.r,nc,r

and the circumstances

at

from Leif Odmark to Kurt Nelson at the USFS dated July I

was a
1998, detailing that Mr. Odmark

had met with and coordinated with Douglas Woodcock on the pending '·application for a
permanent easement" and referencing Lot 8. Transcript on Appeal, July 23. 2014, p. 11, L. 4-11.
Admission of Mr. Odmark·s letter would have provided the Court with evidence of Mr.
Odmark's intent in creating the Temporary Easement and assisted the Court with the
interpretation of the document as a whole. The second document excluded by the District Court
was a letter from Blaine County Planning and Zoning to Kurt Nelson at the USFS. dated August
11, 1998, regarding the application for a special use permit. The Blaine County Planning and
Zoning Department recommended that '·access to Lot 8 should be allowed from this same
easement that the Woodcocks are requesting, if it is approved:' Transcript on Appeal, July 23,
2014, p. 36. Admission of this letter would establish the clear intent to grant permanent access
through the USFS for both Lots 8 and 9 as a precondition of vacating Jones Lane. The Staff
Report to the Blaine County Board of Commissioners and the Forest Service News Release both
were excluded from consideration for any evidence of intent.
All relevant evidence of intent regarding an ambiguous document should be allowed.
''When an instrument is ambiguous in nature. the intention of the parties as reflected by all of the
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was given must be considered in construing
the granting instrument." Latham v. Garner. 105 Idaho 854. 858. 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Idaho
1983) (citing Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243,250.270 P.2d 825. 829-30 (1954)). "Therefore, the
trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence of the circumstances and intentions of the
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original parties to the easement.,. Id
to
accepted

..

court must consider all of the extrinsic
were

they executed

instrument. Id.

additional relevant evidence on the question of intent that they may have." Id.
Failure to grant the motions to amend the complaint to open up these documents and their
respective witnesses into the case, constituted error of the court because the documents provide
relevant evidence of both the intent of the drafter of the easement and the circumstances in
existence at the time the Temporary Easement was drafted. Granting the amendment to the
complaint with these documents and witnesses would have shown that Mr. Odmak, Blaine
County, the USFS, and the Woodcocks were working together to preserve the wetlands area
bordering Lots 7, 8, and 9 by vacating Jones Lane. In order to prevent problems of access to
these lots, all parties and agencies involved were working towards the establishment of
permanent access over the USFS lands to the east of the lots. This had been contemplated since
1998, two years prior to the sale of Lot 8 to Ms. Wescott. At the time the sale was negotiated,
Mr. Odmark was fully expecting the USFS to grant the permanent access to Lots 8 and 9 within
a short time. The Temporary Easement constituted a short-term solution to cover that period
until the access easement was recorded by the U.S. Forest Service. The access contemplated was
provided within four months of the transfer of Lot 8 to Ms. Wescott and was recorded on
August 15, 2000. Mr. Odmark's letter to the USFS uses the same language that was used in the
Temporary Easement, clarifying his intention that the Temporary Easement was only to be in
place until the USFS access was resolved. The District Court erred in refusing to allow the
amendments to the case.
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The Temporary Easement is Equitably Unenforceable and Void for Lack
of an Adequate Legal Description.

16.
Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment qmetmg title
the Temporary
Access Easement is expired. void. terminated. and is no longer an encumbrance
on the Plaintiffs. property.
One of the equitable legal principals voiding a real property transfer is the lack of an adequate
legal description. At the trial limited only to equitable issues, Mr. Kirk testified. referring to the
language of the Temporary Easement, as follows:
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Q So you testified you went to the courthouse,
and you found the map and the deed. and it had this -A Easement.
Q This easement?
A Yes.
Q So you read it at that point?
A Yes.
Q Is there any way, can you measure that
easement or chart it out? Did you try do that on the
corner of your lot?
A I tried to decipher what the coordinates are,
but there are no coordinates of this easement. It's
ambiguous as to what where, and how, if it was needed,
where it would be.

13
14
15
16
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1

Q I'd ask you. Mr. Kirk. to tum to Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 3. That's the warranty deed you found at the
courthouse. correct?
A Correct.
Q And the second page is the temporary easement
that you just referred to?
A The circled part on page .
Q The second page where it says Exhibit 1.
A Oh. yes.
Q That's the wTiting about the temporary
easement, correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And that's -- is that the part that you
said you didn't have any coordinates on it?

6

WITNESS: Yes.

17
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16
8
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2

Q Okay. So what would
equitable basis
to
comer
rather than leave this problem
Ms. Wescott's
temporary easement? What would you say to Judge Elgee?
A I would say, one, we're arguing over a
temporary easement which, in my view. doesn't even or
wouldn't solve the problem Ms. Wescott was ever
revoked the permanent or the easement from the forest
service, because if I measure 25 feet, it doesn't even
reach the county road. It would still access onto the
forest service easement road anyway --

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Q Okay. How does that weigh. in your mind. as
to equities that you would say to Judge Elgee as to
having your corner of your lot continued to be clouded
by this problem?
A I'm kind of gun shy to speak now.
Q Right. Go ahead.
A It leaves me holding the bag here for the
neighbor with a cloud over my title with an easement
that's not defined, but yet she still has access, she's
got a driveway. it's in pavement. Hitchins, south of
her access. Has two lovely homes there, permanent
access. But I've got cloud over my title that I can't
use this part of my lot now at that I purchased because
of the interpretation of the temporary easement that
Leif Odmark, a layman in himself over these things, the
way I understand it, put in a temporary easement to
help Ms. Wescott get access she needed to if they
didn't come up with the forest service easement, which
they did.

Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, pp. 65

17-23: 66-67 LL 17-1: 68-69 Ll. 16-2; 78-79 LL

15-8. In closing argument, Kirks' counsel argued in part:
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

But when you look at this language on this
temporary easement, and the word temporary is used over
and over, so we know it was intended to be something
short-term. but it uses 20-foot wide easement in the
southeast comer oflot 7, block 1. And the only
additional information is on
attachments, two
circles. The next page it just circles
corner
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16
17
8
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2

there, no metes and bounds. no measurements.
nothing. just a circle on
And then the last page is a
defined, but
kind
anybody
measurements, no nothing. I
there and decide, where does the 25-foot start? As
what comer? Where do you start
measurement
25 feet? Wide or long? ls it the width north to south
or east to west? There's no way to decide what that
easement is. It's so vague and
it's a big
problem for enforcing this thing. But it is what it
IS.

Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, pp. 94-95,

9-2.

With regards to the sufficiency of real property transfer descriptions, a court must be able
to determine from the face of the express document, not only the quantity and identity of the
property being transferred, but also its boundaries. Lexington Heights. 140 Idaho at 281, 92 P .3d
at 531: Bauchman-Kingston, 2008 WL 5133788 at *3; Ray, 146 Idaho at 629,200 P. 3d at 1178;
and Magnolia Enterprises. LLC

Schons, 2009 WL 1658022, *4. The express document may

reference an extrinsic document if that document is exact in detailing the quantity, identity and
boundaries of property being sold. Id.

property description that does not allow the court to

pinpoint exactly what acreage is to be transferred is inadequate." Bauchman-Kingston. 2008 WL
5133788 at *3; Ray, 146 Idaho at 630,200 P. 3d at 1179.
In the 2004 Lexington Heights case, the Idaho Supreme Court found a land sale contract
invalid for failing to exactly describe the boundaries of the acreage reserved from the sale of a
larger parcel. Supra. Lexington Heights Development, LLC, (''Lexington Heights") entered into
an express agreement for the purchase of approximately 90 acres to be carved from a 95-acre
parcel owned by Roger and Elizabeth Crandlernire. Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 279, 92 P.3d
at 529.
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Since the Lexington Heights case,
2008
to reach

Supreme

has revisited the issue of deficient
l.

the case

Partnership.

same conclusion.

Haroldsen 2008 WL 5133788 (2008). The

V.

in the Bauchman-Kingston case executed a

document in May of 2000 for the phased purchase of 200-acres located in Bonneville
County, Idaho. 2008 WL 5133788 at *1. Under the terms of the contract, Bauchman-Kingston
was to purchase the acreage over a six year period of time, which would culminate in the final
purchase of the Seller's personal residence and out-buildings located on the last 4.9 acres. Id
By June of 2006, Bauchman-Kingston had purchased all but 36 acres upon which were 4.9 acres
including the Seller's residence and some out-building. Id at *3. Regarding the description of
the 4.9 acres, the contract stated at paragraph 26:

OTHER TERMS: BUYER AGREE
PURCHASE SELLERS [sic]
RESIDENCE AND OUT BUILDINGS LOCATED 3359 N 5 WEST, AT
FAIR MARKET VALUE WITH TERMS ACCEPT ABLE TO SELLER.
PURCHASE PRICE SHALL BE BASED ON APPRAISEL [sic]
ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SELLER AND BUYER. BUYERS ARE
COMPLETING A l 031 EXCHANGE WITH PURCHASE OF THIS
PROPERTY.
Id at* 1.

The Supreme Court in Bauchman-Kingston declined to enforce the contract by relying on
the Lexington Heights ruling to conclude the Bauchrnan-Kingston agreement was invalid and
unenforceable as to the property description regarding the 4. 9 acres. Id.

The Court specifically

stated, ''when only part of a parcel is sold, and neither the land to be conveyed nor the portion to
be retained by the seller is adequately described, the property description is inadequate." Id at
*3 (citing to Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 282, 92 P.3d at 532). The Court also emphasized
that ''[a] property description that does not allow the court to pinpoint exactly what acreage is to
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transferred is inadequate.,. Id. (citing to

Rehn.

Idaho L 3, 644 P.2d

(

case

Ray v.

language the state of lmv as it pertains to the standard requiring property descriptions.

See

generally, Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009). In the Ray case, the parties
entered into a written agreement for the sale of property described as: --2275 W. Hubbard Rd.,
City of Kuna, County of Ada, Idaho 83634. ·· Id. at 626, 200 3d. 1175. The Ray Court rejected
the written agreement because the property description contained in the agreement failed to
specify the quantity and boundaries of the prope11y being sold. Id. at 629. 200 3d. 1178. The
Court stated, ··A description of real property must adequately describe the property so that it is

(citing to Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,435, 80 P.3 1031, 1036 (2003)). (emphasis added).
The state of the law in Idaho regarding the standard for property descriptions required is
clearly stated. A reference to a lot and block number without a political subdivision is not
enough. Allen v. Kitchen. 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909). A reference to a tax parcel notice
is not enough.

Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031. 1036 (Idaho 2003).

A

reference to a street address without a legal description is not enough. Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho
625, 200 P.3d 1174, 1177 (Idaho 2009).

A reference to a map with writing is not enough.

Bauchman-Kingston Partnership LP v. Haroldsen. No. 345 L 2008 WL 5133788, at *4 (Idaho
2008). A reference to a survey yet to be conducted of land excluded from a sale is not enough.

White v. Rehn. 103 Idaho 1,644 P.2d 323,325 (1982). And finally, a reference to a survey to be
performed after execution of the contract is not enough. Lexington Heights Development, LLC v.

Crandlemire. 140 Idaho 276. 92 P.3d 526, 531 (Idaho 2004). The Idaho Supreme Court. has
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it clear that

it is the

wide Easement of Access (see plat map-Exhibit

state of the law in

over the Southeast corner of Lot 7 of Block l

.... " The Exhibit 2 referred to has only a hand drawn circle around the triangular comer and
another page has only a hand drawing on the plat map with no beginning point no survey
markings, no coordinates, no curvature descriptions, no lengths marked. and in short nothing to
reasonably define the size and scope of

purported easement.

Where does one begin to

measure the purported 25 feet? Where does it end? What direction does the 25 feet run? How
much acreage does it cover? What is the curvature on the SE corner? There are no answers to
any of these reasonable questions as to where the purported easement is located. Not only is the
language of the Temporary Easement vague, the court cannot determine quantity and identity
with any degree of certainty where it is to be located on the ground.
Based upon the extensive case law authority set forth above, the trial court·s failure to
grant equitable relief to Kirks based upon the lack of an adequate legal description was clearly
erroneous.

V.

The Precondition was Not Satisfied for the Temporary Easement to
Become "In Effect," and in any Event, the Temporary Easement Expired
After One Year.
By the express terms of the Temporary Easement drafted by Mr. Odmark, the easement

never came into effect. Pursuant to the second paragraph, the easement would only come ··111
Effect" upon receipt by the owner of Lot 8 of a written denial of access by the USFS. This grant
of the "temporary Easement of Access" specifically states an express precondition to the title
passing. The grant states that the easement does not become
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Thus. the precondition was never satisfied giving effect to the ·'temporary

Easement of Access." It is undisputed that Ms. Wescott historically used the USFS road on the
east to access Lot 8 and that Ms. Wescott continues to use the USFS easement today. Based on
these facts. at no time did the ..temporary Easement of Access'' become effective.
Notwithstanding this express precondition requiring absolute denial of an easement by
the Forest Service before the ..temporary Easement of Access" came into effect. the express
terms of the "temporary Easement of Access'' also contained specific temporal limitations to the
grant. The grantor specifically stated in the grant that the owner of Lot 8 may only have use of
an easement for ··one year or upon completion of the drivevvay, whichever occurs first."
(Emphasis added].

It is undisputed that Ms. Wescott completed a [50-foot] circular driveway

with an entrance connecting directly to the Forest Road Easement. Likewise, it is undisputed
that more than one year's time has passed since the grant of the "temporary Easement of Access''
and several years have passed since the driveway was constructed.
With continuous, unimpeded access from the USFS, for over fifteen years, the terms of
the Temporary Easement have long since expired. The District Court should not have given any
enforcement rights to the Temporary Easement.

VI.

Pursuant to I.A.R. 15, Respondent's Untimely Filed Notice of Cross
Appeal Should be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction.
"In Idaho, a timely notice of appeal or cross-appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to

challenge a determination made by a lower court.'' Carr v. Carr. 116 Idaho 754. 757, 779 P.2d
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429, 432 (Idaho App. 1989) (citing LA.R.

to file such a notice 'shall cause
21

on
Rule 1

Idaho Appellate Rules, sets out

a cross-appeal as follows:

(b)
Time for filing. A cross-appeaL as a matter of right, may be made
only by physically filing the notice of cross-appeal with the clerk of the district
court or administrative agency within the 42 day time limit prescribed in Rule
14, as it applies to the judgment or order from which the cross-appeal is
taken. or within 21 days after the date of filing of the original notice of appeal,
whichever is later.
Idaho Appellate Rule 15(b) (emphasis added).
The District Court denied Ms. Wescott' s claim for attorney fees on November 3, 2014. R.
Vol. I, p. 289. Mr. Wescott had 42 days from November 3, 2014 to file her Notice of Cross
Appeal. The Notice of Cross Appeal (Suppl. R. Vol. L p. 70) was not filed until February 23,
2015, a full 112 days after the ·'judgment or order from which the cross-appeal is taken."

Ms. Wescott may argue that her Motion to Reconsider Defendant" s Memorandum of
Costs extended the time to cross-appeal. However. the 42-day timeline is extended only if a timely
motion is filed "which. if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any
judgment in the action (except motions ... regarding costs or attorneys fees).'' I.A.R. 14(a)
(emphasis added).

It is well settled that "the filing of a motion for costs or attorney fees, or an

objection to such a motion, does not extend the time to appeal a judgment" under I.A.R. 14(a).

State ex rel. A1oore v. Lawson, 105 Idaho 164. 165, 667 P.2d 267, 268 (Ct.App.1983): See also
Walton, Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 719. 979

2d 118, 12] (Ct. App. 1999).

Because Ms. Wescott' s cross-appeal was not timely filed. the Comi is without
jurisdiction to make a determination regarding those issues pursuant to J.A.R. 21. Accordingly,
Respondent's cross-appeal should he dismissed.
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Regarding the substance of Wescott' s

(1

are not awardable to the

87

V.

125 S. Ct. 311 (2004). This was not a

cert. denied.

u

brought or pursued frivolously under Idaho

Code § 12-121. Kirks will respond in substance

\1s. Wescott sets out her initial brief on the

cross-appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Kirks respectfully request that this Court reverse the
District Court's judgment dismissing the Kirks' Complaint and order that the First Amended
Complaint be allowed with a full trial on the issues of fact including intent of the Temporary
Easement.

Alternatively, Kirks request reversal and final judgment entered declaring the

termination of the Temporary Easement and otherwise quieting the Kirks' title to the Temporary
Easement and the whole of Lot 7.
DATED this

day of January. 20 6.
EV ANS KEANE LLP

Jed Ma aring, of the Firm
Attorn ' ·s for Appellants
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